JENGA: Exploiting Counter-Based RowHammer Countermeasures to Break Real-Time Predictability
JENGA exploits counter-based RowHammer mitigations to break real-time execution guarantees—an attack that bridges hardware security and functional safety in embedded systems.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2609.01077v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Safety-critical real-time systems must satisfy multiple dependability requirements, notably time predictability and security. In such systems, tasks must complete within bounded and known execution times, typically characterised through Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) analysis. At the same time, DRAM-based platforms are increasingly sensitive to the RowHammer read-disturbance security vulnerability, which has motivated the development of numerous
Editorial Analysis
Safety-critical industries may face a new class of timing attacks where hardware security countermeasures themselves become the exploit vector, complicating certification and assurance.
Review RowHammer mitigation strategies on real-time embedded platforms for potential timing-side-channel exposure.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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