SenTrojan: Revealing Analog Hardware Trojan Attacks on Sensors
A new framework demonstrates generalised analog hardware Trojan attacks on sensors, moving beyond device-specific exploits to threaten broader cyber-physical system integrity.
Summary written by editorial AI · Source link below
arXiv:2611.06103v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Sensors bridge the physical and digital worlds, making their integrity critical to cyber-physical system security. Existing sensor attacks largely exploit unintended and sensor-specific physical vulnerabilities, limiting their generalizability and motivating a different threat model, i.e., whether an adversary can implant hidden attack surfaces into sensors before deployment. In this paper, we present SenTrojan, an analog hardware Trojan framework
Editorial Analysis
Enterprises operating OT/ICS environments face a widening hardware supply-chain threat as sensor-level Trojans become more generalisable and harder to detect.
Forward-looking interpretation drafted by editorial AI under human review — not a reproduction of the source. See methodology.
External link — opens at arXiv Crypto & Security in a new tab.
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